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1. Introduction  
In article 53 Vienna Convention, a peremptory norm of general internati
(jus cogens) is defined as a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character.
Art. 64 of Vienna Convention provides that if a new peremptory norm of general 
international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm 
becomes void and terminates.
An important question arise from analize of th
competent authority to identify these norms? We could also envisage the creation 
of jus cogens via acts of international organizations, including in particular by 
resolutions of their political organs. The ICJ has expressed su
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advisory opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide1. 
The way of adopting of article 53 led some authors to the conclusion that the 
concept of jus cogens would never acquire the status of customary law unless the 
Vienna Convention would gain universal acceptance (Jerzy, 1974, p. 204; Reuter, 
1972, pp. 138-143). 
Another author remarked in connection with the retroactivity clause of the Vienna 
Convention that it was introduced during the Conference as Art.4 in order to avoid 
the retroactive effect of certain provisions of the Convention, including article 53 
and article 64. This shows that both stipulations amounted to progressive 
development of international law (Rozakis, 1976, p. 39). 
In case of a dispute among the parties to the Convention as to the interpretation of 
art.53 and art. 64 any of the parties concerned can refer that dispute to the ICJ or 
arbitration (Tomuschat et al., 2006, p. 86).  
International crimes that rise to the level of jus cogens constitute obligation erga 
omnes which are inderogable. Legal obligations which arise from the higher status 
of such crimes include the duty to prosecute or extradite, the non applicability of 
statutes of limitations for such crimes, the non-applicability of any immunities up 
to and including Heads of State, the non-applicability of the defense of “obedience 
to superior orders” (save as mitigation of sentence), the universal application of 
these obligations whether in time of peace or war, their non-derogation under 
“states of emergency,” and universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of such crimes. 
The implications of jus cogens are those of a duty and not of optional rights; 
otherwise jus cogens would not constitute a peremptory norm of international law. 
Consequently, these obligations are non-derogable in times of war as well as peace 
(Bassiouni, 1996, pp. 63-66). 
Articles of the International Law Commission identified as jus cogens the 
prohibitions of aggression and the illegal use of force, the prohibitions against 
slavery and the slave trade, genocide and racial discrimination and apartheid, the 
prohibition against torture, the basic rules of international humanitarian law and the 
right of self-determination. The following norms have been added to these: the 
prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and crimes against humanity, 
                                                 





the prohibition of piracy, and the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources. The German Constitutional Court considered even the basic rules for the 
protection of the environment as forming part of jus cogens (Tomuschat et al., 
2006, pp. 99-100). 
Positive International Criminal Law does not contain such an explicit norm as to 
the effect of characterizing a certain crime as part of jus cogens. Furthermore, the 
practice of states does not conform to the scholarly writings that espouse these 
views. The practice of the states evidences that, more often than not, impunity has 
been allowed for jus cogens crimes, the theory of universality has been far from 
being universally recognized and applied, and the duty to prosecute or extradite is 
more inchoate than established, other than when it arises out of specific treaty 
obligations. 
 
2. Judgments of National Courts and Torture 
Bouzari sued the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Ontario Superior Court under 
Canada’s State Immunity Act 1985 (SIA), claiming damages for torture. Bouzari, 
of course, had nowhere else to bring a civil action. As with most victims of torture, 
it was impossible for Bouzari to return to the scene of the crime in order to lodge a 
claim against the state. Sovereign states are presumptively immune from suit in 
Canada unless the case meets one or more exceptions contained in the SIA. 
Bouzari argued for the application of three exceptions to immunity; the section 18 
exception for criminal proceedings; the tort exception found in section 6 which 
provides that a foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a court in any 
proceedings that relate to (a) any death or personal or bodily injury, or (b) any 
damage to or loss of property; and the section 5 commercial activity exception. 
Bouzari also claimed that the SIA must be read in conformity with Canada’s 
international legal obligations and that, both by treaty and peremptory norms of 
customary international law, Canada is bound to permit a civil remedy against a 
foreign state for torture abroad. Specificaly Bouzari contended that article 14 of the 
Convention against Torture required Canada to provide him with the opportunity to 
seek redress from his torturers. Article 14 provides that “Each State Party shall 
ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and 
has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means 
for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a 
result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation”.  
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Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other person to 
compensation which many exist under national law. In the Ontario Superior Court, 
Swinton J. expressed sympathy for Bouzari’s plight but found that his case did not 
fall within one of the enumerated exceptions of Canada’s State Immunity Act. The 
Court found that despite the plea for punitive damages, the statute is civil, not 
criminal, in nature; that the commercial activity exception was inapplicable 
because the activity giving rise to the case was imprisonment by agents of the 
foreign state and acts of torture performed by them in a state prison; and that the 
tort exception does not apply to injuries which occur outside Canada. The Superior 
Court also refused to import a new exception for torture committed outside Canada 
into the Act and found that the SIA is consistent with Canada’s international 
obligations, including the Convention against Torture. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal affirmed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that Canadian law precludes 
claims against foreign sovereigns for acts not enumerated in the statute, including 
torture. Goudge J.A declared that the wording of the SIA must be taken as a 
complete answer to this argument. Section 3(1) could not be clearer. To reiterate, it 
says:  “(1) Except as provided by this Act, a foreign state is immune from the 
jurisdiction of any court in Canada.”  The plain and ordinary meaning of these 
words is that they codify the law of sovereign immunity.  In sum, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that the SIA occupies the field in this area and that it provides no 
exception for torture. Like the Superior Court, the Court of Appeal agreed that the 
prohibition against torture constitutes a rule of jus cogens, but held that the norm 
does not encompass the civil remedy sought by Bouzari. The Superior Court 
evaluated expert testimony on the subject and concluded that while the law may be 
moving in this direction, neither emerging state practice nor article 14 of the 
Convention Against Torture requires it to take civil jurisdiction over a foreign state 
for acts committed outside the forum state. When the Supreme Court of Canada 
refused Bouzari’s request for leave to appeal, his domestic remedies were 
effectively exhausted. In May 2005, however, the UN Committee against Torture 
(CAT), the international body tasked with monitoring implementation of the treaty, 
expressed concern at Canada’s failure to provide a civil remedy through the 
domestic judiciary for all victims of torture. In its concluding observations, the 
CAT noted the absence of effective measures to provide civil compensation to 
victims of torture in all cases, and recommended that Canada review its position 
under article 14 of the Convention to ensure the provision of compensation through 




The facts of Ferrini are unfortunately typical of the situation arising in Italy during 
the German occupation during the latter part of World War II. On 4 August 1944, 
the applicant, Luigi Ferrini, was captured by German troops in the province of 
Arezzo and deported to Germany where he was forced to work for the war industry 
until 20 April1945. On 23 September 1998, Ferrini petitioned the Court of Arezzo 
for reparation from Germany for physical and psychological harm due to the 
inhuman treatment he was subject to while imprisoned. However, the Court of First 
Instance applied the international norm guaranteeing foreign state immunity for all 
acts carried out by states in the exercise of their sovereign powers. Thus, the Court 
held that the Italian courts had no jurisdiction in this matter. To this end, the Court 
considered that, even though the treatment inflicted on Ferrini could be considered 
a war crime in accordance with the international law of the time, the German acts 
were of a sovereign nature. Ferrini turned to the Court of Appeal in Florence, 
which upheld the findings of the Court of First Instance. The appellant’s case was 
then brought before the Supreme Court, which drew a conclusion which was 
exactly the opposite of the previous decisions. Thus, the Supreme Court asserted 
that a foreign state cannot enjoy immunity for sovereign acts which can be 
classified as international crimes at the same time. The Court reached such 
conclusion by strictly focusing on the four arguments proposed by Ferrini, which 
need to be briefly examined (Sena et al., 2005, p. 93). 
The first of these arguments involved the application to this case of the 1968 
Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (today replaced, except for Denmark, by Council Regulation 
44/10 of22 December 2000). The appellant argued that the Convention’s 
provisions prevailed over the customary rule on state immunity. Without analyzing 
the merits of this issue, the Court wholly rejected this argument, pointing out that 
the Convention is not applicable to suits relating to sovereign acts, in line with 
consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. On this basis the Court 
rejected the connected third argument proposed by the applicant, according to 
which the Court should refer the case to the European Court of Justice (Sena et al., 
2005, p. 93). 
The second argument was based upon questioning the customary nature of the state 
immunity rule, and its subsequent application in Italian law by virtue of article10 of 
the Italian Constitution. This argument was also rejected by the Court, which 
asserted that there could be no doubt concerning the existence of a customary norm 
of international law obliging States to abstain from exercising jurisdiction against 
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foreign States. Nonetheless, the Court went on to affirm that this norm, which 
initially was ‘absolute  in  nature, in that it granted foreign State full immunity, has 
become, and continues to become, gradually limited (Sena et al., 2005, p. 94). 
The latter consideration is particularly significant, as on this basis the Supreme 
Court discussed the fourth and main argument proposed by the appellant, namely, 
whether the immunity principle must apply even here. In this regard, the Court 
began by citing a number of precedents in Italian and foreign jurisprudence, where 
the principle of immunity of foreign sovereign activities, and especially of those 
activities strictly connected to warfare, had been applied. The Court was underlined 
some legally relevant elements used to justify the opposite solution adopted in the 
Ferrini case. One of these elements was the fact that the event took place in Italy, 
on the territory of the forum state. According to the Court, the existence of such an 
exception is further justified in the light of individual responsibility provided for by 
international law relating to state officials committing international crimes while 
carrying out official duties. Given that such responsibility constitutes an exception 
to the traditional rule of functional immunity, and the latter rule is an expression of 
the general principle of state sovereignty, this exception would necessarily extend – 
in the Court’s view – even to state immunity per se, which would equally represent 
no more than a corollary of this general principle. Nevertheless, the Court observed 
that the general norms of international law which protect the freedom and dignity 
of the person as fundamental rights, and which recognize as international crimes 
such behaviour as would seriously damage the integrity of these values are an 
integral part of Italian law. These norms are therefore fully able to set legal 
parameters for the injury arising from an intentional or negligent act. In other 
words, in the Italian legal system, the violation of these norms would imply the 
violation of a legal right, even with respect to individuals. Furthermore the Court 
pointed out that the non-justiciable nature of carrying out the administration of the 
State at the highest level is not an obstacle to the verification of any individual 
crime committed during the exercise of such power, and the assessment of 
responsibility, either in criminal or civil jurisdiction. In the Court’s opinion, the 
norms on state immunity, like all the other norms of international law, have to be 
interpreted in a systematic way, in accordance with other principles of the same 
legal system. It follows that for consistency’s sake, further exceptions to immunity, 
different from those so far established and codified, may be recognized. One of 
these exceptions results from the need to give priority to hierarchically superior 




protection of values whose safeguard is to be considered essential to the whole 
international community. It would seem that the stages of the judgment examined 
here illustrate clearly that the notion of jus cogens is not used in strictly normative 
or formal terms. Rather, as we have just shown, the Supreme Court felt the need to 
specify that the refusal to grant Germany immunity from jurisdiction was based on 
the need to emphasize substantial values of international law, such as those 
regarding respect for the human person. In other words, in the Ferrini case, there 
seems to be a balancing of two fundamental principles of international law: i.e., the 
principle of sovereign equality of states (implying the recognition of sovereign 
immunity) and that of the respect of inviolable human rights (which forms the 
background of the legal regime of international crimes) (Sena et al., 2005, pp. 94-
103). 
The Greek Supreme Court (Areopag) in 2000 denied State immunity for sovereign 
acts taken in violation of international jus cogens. The Areopag was faced with 
civil claim for damages based on atrocities against the civilian population which a 
German SS unit had committed in 1944 during the German occupation of Greece 
(the Distomo village massacre). It based itself essentially on three grounds for 
denying Germany immunity. Firstly, as the outrages constituted violations of jus 
cogens they could not be qualified as sovereign acts (acta jure imperii). Moreover 
to the so-called foreign tort exception, which was part of customary international 
law, Germany could not claim immunity for torts which its agents had committed 
in the territory of Greece as the forum State. The consent of the Greek minister of 
justice, required for the execution of the decision, was refused, and this refusal was 
upheld by the Greek courts and the European Court of Human Rights. The Areopag 
decision was rendered at least partially obsolete by a decision to the contrary of 17 
September 2002 in parallel case that handed down by the Greek Supreme Special 
Court which has the competence to resolve differences between the various 
branches of the Greek judiciary (Tomuschat et al., 2006, p. 220). 
In 23.12.2008, Germany institutes proceedings against Italy for failing to respect its 
jurisdictional immunity as a sovereign State in front of International Court of 
Justice, case has not been completed until now1. 
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On 10 June 1944, SS forces integrated into the German occupying troops in Greece 
shot some 200-300 of the inhabitants of the mountain village of Distomo, near 
Delphi in central Greece, in retaliation for an attack by Greek partisans. The 
victims of the massacre, among them the plaintiffs’ parents, were mainly elderly 
persons, women and children who had not been involved in the partisan activities. 
The plaintiffs, children at the time of the incident, only survived the massacre 
because a German soldier warned them and urged them to hide. As a consequence 
of the incident, the plaintiffs suffered, inter alia, psychic damage as well as 
disadvantages regarding their personal and professional advancement (Rau, 2006, 
p. 702). 
In September 1995, the plaintiffs brought action for declaratory judgment before 
the Landgericht (Regional Court) of Bonn claiming that Germany was liable to pay 
compensation for the incident. The Regional Court dismissed the action and the 
plaintiffs lodged a Berufung (appeal) with the Oberlandesgericht (OLG – Higher 
Regional Court) of Cologne, which upheld the lower court’s decision. On 26 June 
2003, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH -Federal Court of Justice) rejected the plaintiffs 
application for Revision (appeal on points of law), arguing that neither 
international law nor domestic state liability law, as of 1944, provided a basis for 
the plaintiffs claims. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs also had participated in a claim for 
damages for the Distomo massacre before the District Court of Livadeia in Greece. 
The proceedings resulted, in October 1997, in a default judgment against Germany. 
This ruling was upheld by the Areopag (Greek Supreme Court) in a judgment of 4 
May 2000. However, the Federal Court of Justice, in its decision of 26 June 2003, 
found that it could not give enforceable recognition to the judgment of the District 
Court of Livadeia because the acts at issue had been sovereign or public acts (acta 
jure imperii) for which Germany was immune from another state’s jurisdiction. 
Against the German ordinary courts’ decisions, the plaintiffs filed a 
Verfassungsbeschwerde (constitutional complaint) to the BVerfG, pursuant to 
article 93 para. 1 (4a) of the Grundgesetz (GG – Basic Law or Constitution) in 
conjunction with Sections 13(8), 90-95 of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz 
(BVerfGG - Federal Constitutional Court Act) ( Rau, 2006, pp. 703-704). 
Before turning to the plaintiffs’ arguments, the BVerfG addressed the issue of 
whether the refusal, by the Federal Court of Justice, to recognize the judgment of 
the District Court of Livadeia was in conformity with the Basic Law. Without 
going into much detail, the BVerfG found that, indeed, it was. According to current 




state’s jurisdiction if and to the extent that acts of sovereign power (acta jure 
imperii) were at issue. As the SS unit involved in the Distomo incident had been 
integrated into the German occupying forces, its acts were to be classified as acta 
jure imperii, irrespective of whether or not they were to be considered legal under 
international law. Consequently, the Federal Court of Justice had been right in 
holding that the judgment of the District Court of Livadeia was not binding on the 
German courts. It is not fully clear why the BVerfG felt inclined to pronounce on 
this issue. The plaintiffs did not raise the question of res judicata before the Court. 
The BVerfG itself did not specify in any way how the decision of the Federal Court 
of Justice, refusing to recognize the judgment of the District Court of Livadeia, 
might have affected the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Rather, the BVerfG 
confined itself to a more or less abstract constitutional review of the refusal of 
enforceable recognition without linking its examination to a particular provision of 
the Basic Law. By holding that the judgment of the District Court of Livadeia was 
not to be recognized by the Federal Court of Justice because it contravened the 
rules of state immunity, the BVerfG expressly adhered to the view that, under 
international law as it stands today, there is no exception to immunity from 
adjudication that allows for private suits against foreign states for violations of 
international law. Thus, the BVerfG’s ruling adds another important precedent to 
the list of domestic and international decisions arguing against such an exception. 
One would have wished, however, that the Court, once it entered into the debate on 
the effect of the Greek decision, had discussed in some more depth the issue of 
state immunity for acts contrary to international law. Apart from a reference to the, 
albeit highly important, decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
in the Al-Adsani case, the BVerfG did not go any deeper into the existing 
jurisprudence and literature in that field (Rau, 2006, p. 702). 
 
 
3. Decisions of International Courts 
In the Case of the Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yogoslavia (ICTY) suggested obiter dictum that the violation of a 
jus cogens norm, such as the prohibition against the torture, had direct legal 
consequences for the legal character of all official domestic actions relating to the 
violation (Wet, 2004, pp. 97-98). 
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On 17 October 2000 the Democratic Republic of the Congo filed in the Registry of 
the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Kingdom of Belgium 
in respect of a dispute concerning an “international arrest warrant issued on 11 
April 2000 by a Belgian investigating judge against the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in office of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia 
Ndombasi. 
In that Application the Congo contended that Belgium had violated the “principle 
that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another State”, the 
“principle of sovereign equality among all Members of the United Nations, as laid 
down in article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations”, as well as 
“the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State, 
as recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court and following from article 41, 
paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on Diplomatic Relations”. 
On 11 April 2000 an investigating judge of the Brussels tribunal de première 
instance issued “an international arrest warrant in absentia” against Mr. Abdulaye 
Yerodia Ndombasi, charging him, as perpetrator or co-perpetrator, with offences 
constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the 
Additional Protocols thereto, and with crimes against humanity. The arrest warrant 
was circulated internationally through Interpol. At the time when the arrest warrant 
was issued Mr. Yerodia was the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo. The 
crimes with which Mr. Yerodia was charged were punishable in Belgium under the 
Law of 16 June 1993 concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the 
International Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of Protocols I and II of 
8 June 1977 Additional Thereto, as amended by the Law of 19 February 1999 
concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law1. 
International Court of Justice, 14 February 2002 by thirteen votes to three, finds 
that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the arrest warrant of 11 
April 2000, and its international circulation, constituted violations of a legal 
obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, in that they failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo enjoyed under international law. 
                                                 





In case Al Adsani v. UK (2002) the question posed to the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights was whether Al-Adsani’s right of access to a 
court under Art. 6 (1) of the ECHR with regard to his damage claim against 
Kuwait, whose officials had allegedly tortured the applicant, had been violated by 
the English courts granting of immunity to the respondent State. A bare 9:8 
majority of the Grand Chamber denied this question, emphasizing that the right of 
the access to a court was not absolute but might be subject to limitations. Art. 6 (1) 
of the ECHR should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of 
international law of which it forms part, including those relating to the grant of 
State immunity. Although the prohibition on torture had achieved the status of 
international law, to which it belongs, including those relating to the grant of State 
immunity. Although the prohibition on torture had achieved the status of 
international jus cogens the majority was unable to discern any firm basis in 
current State practice for concluding that a State no longer enjoyed immunity from 
civil claims in the courts of another State where acts of torture were alleged. 
However, the main dissenting opinion, supported by six judges, discovered a 
conflict between the higher-ranking prohibition on torture, as part of jus cogens, 
and the lower-ranking rule on State immunity and concluded that therefore the 
latter rule was superseded (Tomuschat et al., 2006, p. 218). 
 
4. Conclusions 
An important message in the application of absolute prohibitions of torture as jus 
cogens norm and other norms of jus cogens would give the International Court of 
Justice, considering that almost all countries are members of United Nations. Until 
now the International Court of Justice has given priority to the principle of state 
immunity. Limitation of principle of state immunity to the detriment of torture as a 
jus cogensnorm, will make the official persons no longer to have any way to hide 
behind state immunity when commit acts of torture or other jus cogens violations 
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